


Shane M. Coughlan – Student Number 489398
Security Studies – Essay 2



**An analysis of the changing nature of security in
Western Europe and North America since 1989.**

Index

Page 3 Abstract

Page 4 An analysis of the changing nature of security in Western Europe and
North American since 1989

Page 19 Bibliography

Abstract

The year 1989 marked a turning point for security in Western Europe and North America. The Berlin wall fell, a forty-year cold war ended, and the collapse of the Soviet Union began. By 1991 the sharp division between capitalist Western Europe and communist Eastern Europe had ceased to exist, and the bi-polar distribution of world power had changed into a multi-polar arena of many interests. These events completely changed the meaning of security for European and North American countries, and necessitated a change in their approach to making themselves secure. A single Soviet threat – the main focus of defence since the end of World War Two – had disintegrated and been replaced by disparate threats that transcended traditional conceptions of security. Rather than facing an external and unified enemy consisting of conventional and nuclear weaponry, states suddenly had their security concerns expanded to include economic, environmental and internal instability. Terrorism, ethnic conflict and poverty became more pertinent to the security paradigm than preparing for an inter-state conflict. Collective, cooperative security in the name of risk reduction and prevention of conflict replaced the collective of deterrence military used in the past, and the alliance against communism evolved into an alliance against instability. This led to the bastion of cold war security – NATO – evolving from being a purely military organisation into an organisation binding Western Europe and North America together in a community against insecurity, and in doing so expanding its role out of military affairs and into politics, governance and humanitarian affairs.

This paper will examine three distinct eras in its analysis of Western European and North American security after 1989. The first era is that of the cold war, which we will cover only briefly. This will place in context our examination of the post cold war period, taken to cover the period 1989 to 2001, and the post 9-11 period, taken to cover the period 2001 to present. We will argue that these are two distinct periods with different security imperatives. The post cold war period saw the security paradigm widening significantly, and changes in the discourse towards security moving it from inter-state conflict to regional conflict, weapons of mass destruction and intra-state conflicts. These, combined with economic and environmental threats, lead to the increased imperative of collective rather than individual security in nations, and the increased importance of NATO. In contrast, the post 9-11 period altered the security paradigm again by confirming the degree to which the non-conventional threats to states had increased. Threats were no longer ‘over the horizon’, and were not necessarily solved by economic or humanitarian security imperatives. NATO was exposed as virtually useless to deal with genuine terrorist action, and a new bi-polarity emerged of ‘free nations’ against terrorism. By the conclusion of this paper the reader will have a clear understanding of how security has altered twice for Western Europe and North America in the fourteen years since 1989.

Security is a contested subject¹, and we must first define it at least partially before continuing with the analysis. At its most simple security is about protecting people from threats, or preventing threatening events from occurring. The complex thing in security theory is defining what are the threats, and who is to be protected. Is security about securing nations? If so, is it about securing the government and institutions of a nation, the citizens of a nation, or the physical land of a nation? Is

¹ Terrif, Terry et al. *Security Studies Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 1.

security about securing people as a whole? If so, how far does a security remit stretch?² Is security about securing disparate ideas like culture and religion? What needs to be secured, for whom, and how shall it be secured?³ In a conception of security based on realist understandings of the international system security might be defined as the protection of one state from external threats from other states. This is a reflection of the realist conception of unitary state actors existing in a self-help international arena of anarchy. For a realist security is about war – or preventing war – between states.⁴ However, there are alternative conceptions of security, and an example is feminist security. For a feminist theorist security would mean something completely different, as their focus is on gender inequalities that transcend borders.⁵ Security is not about war, but about the fundamental problem of female insecurity in the domestic arena worldwide. Their battlefield is not a geographically defined space, but a cross-cultural perception of sexual roles and the application of violence in such roles.

This paper understands security to be a discursive construct. During the cold war the perceived and constructed threat to Western Europe and North America was the Soviet Union. With the dissolution of the USSR the threats – or the discourse of what constituted those threats – changed. The new insecurities in Europe originated not from invasive war, but from the internal conflicts of former Soviet nations. Ethnic conflict, refugee flows, terrorism and organised crime became the problems that the ‘victors’ of the cold war had to face. This is not to say that such threats were empirically ‘new’. They had existed before and during the cold war as well as after.

² John C. Garnett, “European Security after the Cold War,” in *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World*, ed. M. Jane Davis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996a), 14-15.

³ David Goldfischer, “E. H. Carr: A ‘Historical Realist’ Approach for the Globalisation Era,” in *Review of International Studies* 28 (2002): 717.

⁴ Terrif et al., *Security Studies Today*, p30-32.

⁵ Terrif et al., *Security Studies Today*, p82

What had changed was the perception that West European and North American nations had of their immediate threats. As the security infrastructures altered, and the environment in which they were based evolved, Western defence analysts had to reconstitute their role in the structure of governance. They had to defend against what states in the West perceived as a threat now, rather than what had previously been considered a danger. At its most basic security is about protecting against organised violence of various types⁶, though the construction of what constitutes organised violence is dynamically determined. Security is defence against defined threats that an individual community forms through its constructed perception of danger. Fundamentally then security is what we make of it, and we make it through linguistic constructions.

The cold war created a very particular type of security regime in Western Europe, North America, and across most of the world. After the conclusion of World War Two there were only two significant powers with the ability to project influence in military terms around the world: the USA and the USSR.⁷ With the eruption of hostilities between these two states a distinct division appeared across the world. A bi-polar international system was created⁸, with capitalism being promoted by the USA and communism by the USSR. Countries aligned with one block or another, and in the European sphere very few nations managed to maintain any semblance of neutrality. The division in Europe was starkly geographical, with a split between the East and the West that was centred on the city of Berlin in Eastern Germany. The USA and the USSR each operated a security regime, in which their allies were

⁶ Keith Krause, "Theorizing Security, State Formation and the 'Third World' in the Post-Cold War World," *Review of International Studies* 24 (1998): 135.

⁷ Adrian Hyde-Price, *European Security Beyond the Cold War: Four Scenarios for the Year 2010* (London: Sage 1991), 24.

⁸ James Sperling and Emil Kirchner, "Economic Security and the Problem of Cooperation in Post-Cold War Europe," *Review of International Studies* 24 (1998): 224.

protected by a security promise. For the USA this regime was centred on NATO, with its implicit promise of military protection for any member in the event of conflict, and for the USSR the regime was centred on the Warsaw Pact.⁹ The primary potential cause of conflict in the system was war between the two security regimes. Both regimes possessed substantial conventional and nuclear arsenals, and both had the ability to project at least their nuclear arsenals to any corner of the globe. They were designed to deter and engage with each other, and a great deal of mutual suspicion existed between the USA and the USSR.

During the cold war security was a relatively straightforward affair. For Western Europe and North America – exemplified in the NATO organisation – there was one major threat – the USSR and Warsaw Pact – and a clear policy to deal with them. Deterrence using conventional troops and nuclear weaponry was the order of the day.¹⁰ By preparing a vast army of NATO coordinated troops to engage an invading Soviet force, and by perfecting ballistic missile defence systems, the Western allies created a security shield to constrain and prevent any hostile action against them. The Warsaw Pact did precisely the same for the USSR and the nations aligned with it. This deterrence conception of security reached its apex with Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), whereby any hostile act by either the Warsaw Pact or NATO would result in the destruction of both.¹¹ Indeed, it would result in the destruction of most life on earth if they actually deployed their massive nuclear arsenals. Both parties therefore were prevented from acting against each other in a militarily hostile fashion, and thus they were ‘secured’ from the dangers of the other.

⁹ Hyde-Price, p30.

¹⁰ Robert Jervis, "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace," *American Political Science Review* 96, 1 (2002): p7.

¹¹ Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, " 'A Parallel Globalization of Terror': 9-11, Security and Globalization," *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association* 37,3 (2002): 331.

Conflicts between the Warsaw Pact and NATO security regimes were fought through proxy nations such as Korea and Vietnam, and with the exception of the Cuban Missile Crisis neither block sought to intervene in the vital interests of the other. Whether the rationality of MAD prevented them from doing so, or they just had no vested interest in doing so, is largely irrelevant. Security was understood to be a realist oriented state-to-state affair, with conflict and danger coming from a hostile state or alliance.¹²

When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, and an already Perestroika hobbled USSR effectively became insoluble as a military organisation, it might have been expected that the Western European and North American allies would be able to consider their security problem 'solved'. The threat from the disintegrating Warsaw Pact was negligible, and by 1991 the USSR had imploded and split into disparate individual nations. Deterrence of a large-scale Soviet invasion was unnecessary because any such invasion was clearly impossible, and the bi-polar division of the world was effectively terminated. The West had 'won' the cold war, and capitalist ideology 'ruled' the globe. However, the destruction of the USSR also led to the destruction of the stability of the entire Eastern block, and to a whole host of new security issues stemming from this.¹³ Proxy nations of the USSR around the world suddenly had their finances cut, and the political and military infrastructure on which they depended removed. For the nations of Eastern Europe this proved to be the cause of a whole host of new problems, and by geographical proximity it also became the cause of new security problems for the Western alliance structure. Regional instability¹⁴, Weapons

¹² Terrif et al., *Security Studies Today*, p30-32.

¹³ UNESCO, *Peace and Conflict Issues After the Cold War* (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1992), 42.

¹⁴ Sergei Rogov, "The End of the Cold War: Trends in US and Soviet/Russian Defense Policies and Budgets," in *The Security Watershed: Russians Debating Defense and Foreign Policy After the Cold*

of Mass Destruction¹⁵, and intra-state conflict¹⁶ suddenly became very serious issues for the Western European and North American nations.

The collapsing political entities left over from the Soviet-controlled territories raised issues of economic migration and refugee movements¹⁷, organised crime and the potential of newly formed states using their Soviet military capacity to wage wars amongst each other. The vast nuclear, chemical and biological arsenal of the USSR and Warsaw Pact nations, and the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction by other nations, also presented an enormous problem.¹⁸ It was unclear how well each government was protecting these arsenals, who might have access to them, and what their long-term fate might be. While existing Weapons of Mass Destruction were 'insecure', and with the potential of more nations developing new weapons, the danger of terrorists gaining the ability to cause massive destruction is exponentially increased, as is the ability of small new nations using these weapons on each other. Added to these issues was the problem of internal security and stability in the former Soviet states. Countries like Yugoslavia rapidly disintegrated into ethnic conflicts, with Bosnia and Kosovo providing ample evidence that inter-state conflict was not the major problem the European security theatre would face in the near future.¹⁹ Increasing intra-state conflict, and the chance of such conflict spreading through Eastern Europe, became a plausible scenario. Instead of Western European and North

War, ed. Alexei G. Arbatov (Langhorne, Pennsylvania: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1993), 202.

¹⁵ Paul K. Davis, "Defense Planning for the Post-Cold War Era: Bush, Clinton, and Beyond," in *Clinton and Post-Cold War Defense*, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala (London: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 30.

¹⁶ John C. Garnett, "Introduction: Conflict and Security in the 'New World Order,'" in *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World*, ed. M. Jane Davis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996b), 3.

¹⁷ Sperling and Kirchner, p228.

¹⁸ Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr., "Future Use of Military Power," in *Security Studies for the 21st Century*, ed. Richard H. Schulz, Jr. et al. (London: Brassey's, 1997), 179.

¹⁹ Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell, "Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE, Norms, and the "Construction" of Security in Post Cold War Europe," *International Organization* 53, 3 (1999): 505.

American security problems being ‘solved’ by the collapse of the USSR, it appeared that they had merely gained a greater degree of complexity and uncertainty. The primary threats to the NATO nations were no longer originating from one opposing security block, but from a range of disparate and – if considered from a cold war realist perspective – unconventional sources.

Two of these ‘unconventional sources’ of security instability are economic and environmental issues. During the cold war economics and security were effectively divorced, with the conflict between the NATO nations and the Warsaw Pact nations being perceived as ideological and not economic.²⁰ The onset of a major conflict between Western European, North America and the USSR was unlikely to occur over the control of the Russian oil fields or the German steel mines. Post 1989, however, economic issues have come to the fore in Western security considerations.²¹ The cost of military measures, the impact of economic deprivation on nations, and the importance of economics in the strategic decisions of nations have all been ‘added’ to the security paradigm.²² Former Soviet nations on the border of Western Europe potentially present a threat to the economic security of NATO countries through economic migration or political instability brought about by poverty. Environmental security presents another security problem for nations²³, and is potentially at least as serious as issues of military invasion or economic instability in neighbouring countries. The access to and renewable nature of natural resources presents issues of potential conflict and economic sustainability.²⁴ An example is that the pollution

²⁰ Jonathan Kirshner, “Political Economy in Security Studies After the Cold War,” *Review of International Political Economy* 5,1 (1998): 64.

²¹ Goldfischer, p698.

²² Kirshner ,p81.

²³ Hugh Dyer, “Environmental Security and International Relations: The Case for Enclosure,” *Review of International Studies* 27 (2001): 441.

²⁴ Dyer, p443-444.

caused by the USA is directly affecting nations not only bordering it, but across the world. Ultimately the USA is responsible (along with the UK and Germany and other industrial nations) for killing trees in the Scandinavian countries it is allied with. In effect, one NATO nation is environmentally ‘attacking’ another.

Thus, after 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Warsaw Pact, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world did not become a more ‘secure’ place. For the nations of Western Europe and North America the danger of conventional or nuclear conflict with the USSR may have receded, but it was replaced by a plethora of ‘new’ security issues. This ranged from considerations of economic, political and military instability on the borders of Western Europe, issues of terrorism, problems of organised crime, and environmental concerns. Effectively the NATO nations, particularly those of Western Europe, were no safer from threats than they had been in the cold war. They existed in what Ulrich Beck calls a ‘risk society’²⁵, where they had to respond to real or perceived threats that existed not only in actuality but also in potential. What is called the ‘presence of the future’²⁶ made it important to consider new methods of dealing with problems, and made considerations of options like pre-emptive security a priority. Large-scale instability in nations near to Western Europe had to be defused before they lead to large-scale refugee movements. Weapons of Mass Destruction had to be prevented from falling into terrorist hands. Governments, given the disparate nature of potential security challenges had to assume a ‘managerial’²⁷ role of dealing with crisis as and before they happened, rather than acting as self-contained unitary actors facing only a military challenge from another state. The response of the NATO nations to this challenge was to solidify their cold

²⁵ Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (London: Sage, 1992), 19.

²⁶ Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, “Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society,” *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 30,2 (2001): 294.

²⁷ Rasmussen, 2001, p292.

war security arrangements rather than dissolve their alliance. The risks that Western European and North American states faced over a future containing multiple security threats from multiple actors arguably drove them to greater security integration than before.²⁸

What emerged from the changed Western European and North American security in 1989, and continues to emerge today, is the perceived need for institutions of collective security.²⁹ This is contrary to realist assumptions of alliance break-ups once the primary threat is gone, but reflective of the NATO nations' awareness that their security problems were far from over. The discourse of security in the European and American spheres changed from its cold war rhetoric to one emphasising the new threats of instability in bordering nations, economic imperatives, terrorism and organised crime. The cold war institutions rearticulated themselves as bodies suitable to deal with such threats, and the Western European and North American allies engaged in a dialog of continued cooperation rather than separation.³⁰ NATO, an organisation that was founded in 1949 to counter the possibility to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, did not dissolve with the dissolution of the USSR. It persisted and strengthened itself, and embarked on a process of enlargement that is still ongoing. For the Western allies the end of the cold war ultimately marked the end of one epoch of security cooperation, and the beginning of another. This continued cooperation was not driven by idealism, but the perceived need to deal effectively with future threats, and it ensured that throughout the 1990s Western European and North American nations tended to regard their security concerns as intertwined.³¹

²⁸ Beck, p49.

²⁹ Robert Jervis, "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace," *American Political Science Review* 96, 1 (2002): 1.

³⁰ As predicted by Hyde-Price, p248.

³¹ Mathias Jopp, *The Strategic Implications of European Integration* (London: Brassey's, 1994), 72.

The wider security concerns after the end of the cold war were perceived to need a wider definition of what constituted legitimate security organisations and legitimate security actions, up to and including an attack on a sovereign nation to deal with problems internal to that nation. For NATO this meant expanding its remit from defence and deterrence to the prevention and cure of instability in the European theatre.³² It intervened unsuccessfully in Bosnia in 1994, and with eventual success in Kosovo in 1999 and Macedonia in 2001, to defuse ethnic conflicts. In doing so NATO attempted to alter the discourse of what military organisations are normally expected to do.³³ Its rearticulated mission included humanitarian actions, policing and peacemaking.³⁴ The intentions behind these interventions appeared to have been a mix of humanitarian concerns, the wish of Western European and North American nations to manage the long-term stability of the European theatre, and the prevention of potentially very costly refugee movements.

The institutions of security were effectively rearticulated to deal with the perceived new threats to the security of Western European and North American nations. OSCE, the UN, the EU and especially NATO were rethought to deal with issues arising from the end of the cold war, and were supposedly preparing for the threats of the future. When George Bush declared a 'New World Order' he was referring to the perceived emergence of a liberal democratic political, cultural and security aligned collective of nations.³⁵ The Western nations, by working together through mutually beneficial organisations, would be able to collectively work towards

³² Richard H. Shultz, Jr., "Introduction to International Security," in *Security Studies for the 21st Century*, ed. Richard H. Shultz, Jr. et al. (London: Brassey's, 1997), 146.

³³ Michael C. William and Iver B. Neumann, "From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity," *Millenium: Journal of International Studies* 29,2 (2000): 386.

³⁴ Jef Huysmans, "Shape-Shifting NATO: Humanitarian Action and the Kosovo Refugee Crisis," *Review of International Studies* 28 (2002): 599.

³⁵ Earl C. Ravenal, "The Bush Administration's Defense Policy: Transcending the Cold War," in *From Cold War to New World Order*, ed. Meena Bose and Rosanna Perotti (Westport: Greenwood Press 2002), 392.

all of their interests, not least in the identification, neutralisation and replacement of threats. Traditional security imperatives – such as the now unlikely spectre of invasion by hostile forces – would still face strong deterrence, and new security imperatives – be they economic, migratory, criminal or terrorist – would be dealt with more effectively by international cooperation and interdependence.

This was a proposition that was immediately made problematic by very different levels of capability amongst the Western allies. In security this was especially acute, and NATO operations in the Balkans highlighted a large gap between the ability of the technologically advanced USA and its European partners.³⁶ Inter-operability between European and American forces proved a severe hindrance in already complex non-traditional security operations, and sharp divisions between the USA and some European nations regarding the wisdom of enlarging the remit of security organisations like NATO further complicated matters. By the end of the 1990s, in spite of active security operations to counter instability in several nations and the continued expansion of NATO membership, the feasibility of effective collective security was being challenged by an increasingly bellicose USA. Collective security, though presenting an effective way to deal with existing and new security threats in principle, was difficult to implement in practice. Burden sharing, and disagreements between allies³⁷, restricted the scope and range of responses to threats available to individual nations.

On 11th September 2001 the USA was subject to a terrorist attack that necessitated the further alteration of its security paradigm. For the first time it was subjected to a homeland assault, and one element of the ‘new’ security problem was

³⁶ Michael Clarke and Paul Cornish. "The European Defense Project and the Prague Summit," *International Affairs* 78,4 (2002): 778.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

horrifically realised. A non-state terrorist organisation successfully launched an attack on the one member of NATO furthest removed from traditional geographic locations of combat, and thus for the USA problems like the Balkans were subordinated to concerns over international terrorism, the stance of other countries to such terrorism, and the prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction from falling into terrorist hands.³⁸ The post cold war era of building a collective security regime pursuing stability through intervention and aid was challenged by the need to respond to a very immediate and destructive threat. The USA responded to this challenge not through NATO or its allies, but through what Rasmussen calls an 'imperial' strategy.³⁹ It sought to secure its values and power, and reserved the freedom to act as it saw fit to accomplish this.⁴⁰ Building 'coalitions of the willing' the USA took action against Afghanistan, a nation it believed perpetuated the terrorist organisation that attacked it, and Iraq, a nation that that allegedly possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction. In doing so it implicitly rejected its European allies preference for a 'cosmopolitan' solution based on forging a new collective international system to counter the danger uncovered.⁴¹

In the aftermath of the September 2001 attack on the USA, NATO invoked article 5 of its treaty for the first time. In principle this guaranteed each member state's full support for the USA in its war against terrorism. In actuality it appeared to make little difference to the path the USA had determined to follow. The inability of Western European nations to project military force effectively meant that their actual utility to the USA was limited. Even though NATO was expanding and Russia was

³⁸ James Russell, review of *Putting "Defense" Back into U.S. Defense Policy: Rethinking U.S. Security in the Post-Cold War World*, by Ivan Eland, *Political Science Quarterly*, 117,2 (2002), 317.

³⁹ Rasmussen, 2002, p338.

⁴⁰ Rasmussen,2002,p341.

⁴¹ Rasmussen, 2002,p342.

for the first time explicitly aligning with the Western powers in its perception of mutual security matters⁴², USA coalition building undermined the illusion of collective security, and served to emphasise the disproportionate role of the USA in Western security. In doing so the security imperatives of the post cold war period did not change, but the mechanisms for dealing with them were severely challenged. The world was effectively split into a new bi-polar system, with 'free states' aligned against those that supported or refused to act against perceived terrorist threats.⁴³

In conclusion the end of the cold war heralded a need to reinterpret the security paradigm for Western European and North American nations. The overarching threat of the previous forty years ceased to exist, and conditions relatively distant from state conflict became the imperatives of defence. Regional stability, peacekeeping and dealing with troublesome non-state actors such as organised criminals and terrorists needed a substantially different approach to security as a whole. Though military force was still required it was no longer applicable to all of the threats projected by the broadened security paradigm. The early 1990s saw US lead attempts to consolidate a 'new world order' of collective cooperation to deal with the 'new' problems. NATO intervened for humanitarian and stability reasons in the affairs of sovereign states, and the discourse underlying security was altered from militant cold war rhetoric to language of inclusion, expansion and stable community. However, by the mid-to-late period of the decade issues were arising over the competence and ability of allied nations. Though most allied nations were technically contributing to the collective security of Western Europe and North America, in actuality the USA provided the majority of logistical and technological support to any

⁴² Graeme P. Herd and Ella Akerman, "Russian Strategic Realignment and the Post-Post-Cold War Era?" *Security Dialogue* 33, 3 (2002): 357.

⁴³ Graeme and Akerman, p358.

operation undertaken. The long-term sustainability of George Bush's 'new world order' was thus thrown into question, as the defection of the USA from NATO, or simply a decision by it to act independently in a security orientated situation, would undermine the coherence of the security community.

On the 11th of September 2001 a decisive moment was reached in European and American security. The threat that the USA faced from that point on was indeed one of the projected 'new' security imperatives – that of terrorism – and the use of collective security in dealing with it was called sharply into question. For the USA the urgency of dealing with the terrorist threat, and the further potential threat of terrorist and Weapons of Mass Destruction, overrode the desire to maintain a tight security community comprised of Western Europe and North America. In the two wars that have followed the 9-11 attacks, the USA has sought to build 'coalitions of the willing' instead of attempting to garner the support of all of its allies. This emphasises both the potential independence of the USA in security related matters, and the perceived or actual impotence of its European partners. For security in the Western European and North American regions it signifies a shift of policy being applied to deal with threats. If the aftermath of 1989 and the end of the cold war can be understood to signify an attempt to consolidate Western forces into a permanent security community, the aftermath of 9-11 signals a shift towards more independent (and arguably more efficient) state-based security. Though the future of NATO and the Western alliance are hard to predict, it would appear that the liberal cooperation and interdependence of the 1990s are once more being replaced by a realist suspicion of other states. Partially because of unequal burden sharing, partly because of an unexpected terrorist attack, the attempt to consolidate a necessary alliance of the cold war into a cooperative security community has faltered. War and active defence of

borders – at least for the primary nation in North America – have once more replaced matters of economics, environment and regional stability.

Bibliography

Antonenko, Oksana. "Russia, NATO and European Security After Kosovo." *Survival* 41,4 (1999-2000): 124-144.

Beck, Ulrich. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage, 1992.

Callum, Robert L. "Strategy in the Post-Cold War Age: Where Do We Go from Here?" Review of *The Politics of Strategic Adjustment: Ideas, Institutions, and Interests*, edited by Peter Trubowitz et al. and *The Information Revolution and International Security*, edited by Ryan Henry and C.Edward Peartree. *International Studies Association Reviews*, 1999,151-155.

Canrong, Jin. "The US Global Strategy in the Post- Cold War Era and its Implications for China-United States Relations: a Chinese Perspective." *Journal of Contemporary China* 10, 27 (2001): 309-315.

Carter, Ashton B. "Adapting Us Defence to Future Needs." *Survival* 41,4 (1999-2000): 101-23.

Clarke, Michael and Paul Cornish. "The European Defence Project and the Prague Summit." *International Affairs* 78,4 (2002): 777-788.

Davis, Paul K. "Defense Planning for the Post-Cold War Era: Bush, Clinton, and Beyond." In *Clinton and Post-Cold War Defense*, edited by Stephen J.Cimbala. London: Praeger, 1996.

Dorussen, Han. "Mixing Carrots with Sticks: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Positive Incentives." *Journal of Peace Research* 38,2 (2001): 251-262.

Dyer, Hugh. "Environmental Security and International Relations: The Case for Enclosure." *Review of International Studies* 27 (2001): 441-450.

Flynn, Gregory and Henry Farrell. "Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE, Norms, and the "Construction" of Security in Post Cold War Europe." *International Organization* 53, 3 (1999): 505-535.

Garnett, John C. "European Security after the Cold War." In *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World*, edited by M. Jane Davis. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996a.

Garnett, John C. "Introduction: Conflict and Security in the 'New World Order.'" in *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World*, edited by M. Jane Davis. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996b.

Goldfischer, David. "E.H.Carr: A 'Historical Realist' Approach for the Globalisation Era." *Review of International Studies* 28 (2002): 697-717.

Herd, Graeme P. and Ella Akerman. "Russian Strategic Realignment and the Post-Post-Cold War Era?" *Security Dialogue* 33, 3 (2002): 357-372.

- Huysmans, Jef. "Shape-Shifting NATO: Humanitarian Action and the Kosovo Refugee Crisis." *Review of International Studies* 28 (2002): 599-618.
- Hyde-Price, Adrian. *European Security Beyond the Cold War: Four Scenarios for the Year 2010*. London: Sage, 1991.
- Jervis, Robert. "Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace." *American Political Science Review* 96, 1 (2002): 1-14.
- Jopp, Mathias. *The Strategic Implications of European Integration*. London: Brassey's, 1994.
- Kirshner, Jonathan. "Political Economy in Security Studies After the Cold War." *Review of International Political Economy* 5,1 (1998): 64-91.
- Krause, Keith. "Theorizing Security, State Formation and the 'Third World' in the Post-Cold War World." *Review of International Studies* 24 (1998): 125-136.
- Lai, Brian. "Examining the Goals of US Foreign Assistance in the Post-Cold War Period, 1991-96." *Journal of Peace Research* 40,1 (2003): 103-128.
- Mastny, Vojtech. "Diplomacy and the Legacy of the Cold War: Post-11 September." *Cold War History* 2,3 (2002): 15-28.
- Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Robert L. "Future Use of Military Power." In *Security Studies for the 21st Century*, edited by Richard H. Schulz, Jr., Roy Godson and George H. Quester. London: Brassey's, 1997.
- Quester, George H. "Nontraditional Uses of Military Power." In *Security Studies for the 21st Century*, edited by Richard H. Schulz, Jr., Roy Godson and George H. Quester. London: Brassey's, 1997.
- Ralph, Jason. "Security Dilemmas and the End of the Cold War." *Review of International Studies* 25 (1999): 721-725.
- Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby. "Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 30,2 (2001): 285-309.
- Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby. "'A Parallel Globalization of Terror': 9-11, Security and Globalization." *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association* 37,3 (2002): 323-349.
- Ravenal, Earl C. "The Bush Administration's Defense: Transcending the Cold War." In *From Cold War to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of George H.W. Bush*, edited by Meena Bose and Rosanna Perotti. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002.
- Rogov, Sergei. "The End of the Cold War: Trends in US and Soviet/Russian Defense Policies and Budgets." In *The Security Watershed: Russians Debating Defense and*

Foreign Policy After the Cold War, edited by Alexei G. Arbatov. Langhorne, Pennsylvania: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1993.

Russell, James. Review of *Putting "Defense" Back into U.S. Defense Policy: Rethinking U.S. Security in the Post-Cold War World*, by Ivan Eland. *Political Science Quarterly*, 117,2 (2002), 316.

Sperling, James and Emil Kirchner. "Economic Security and the Problem of Cooperation in Post-Cold War Europe." *Review of International Studies* 24, (1998): 221-237.

Terrif, Terry, Stuart Croft, Lucy James and Patrick M. Morgan. *Security Studies Today*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.

UNESCO. *Peace and Conflict Issues After the Cold War*. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1992.

Williams, Michael C. and Iver B. Neumann. "From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of Identity." *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29,2 (2000): 357-387.